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Erica Fudge considers what it meant to be described as an animal in the 16th and 17th centuries, and
what divided humans from the rest of creation.
IN 1621, WRITING UNDER THE
pseudonym 'Democritus Junior',
the Oxford clergyman and author
Robert Burton (1577-1640) produced
what is perhaps the most famous early
modern exploration of self, The
Anatomy of Melancholy. At the centre of
Burton's discourse is a Renaissance
commonplace: 'Nosce teipsum' - know
thyself. But Burton's call for self-
knowledge comes in a particular
form. Men, he writes,
... are sufficiently informed in all
other worldly businesses as to make a
good bargain, buy, and sell, to keep &
make choice of good Hawk, Hound,
Horse, etc. but for such
matters as concern the
knowledge of
themselves, they are
wholly ignorant and
careless, they know not
what this Body and Soul
are, how combined, of
what parts and faculties
they consist, or how a
Man differs from a Dog.
not a phrase implying real possibility
of a species crossover. However, an
analysis of early modern construc-
tions of perception and the role of
the passions, reveals something
slightly different. Here it is possible
to trace a logic in which humans can
actually become animals through
their actions. The starting point is
often the brain, which, in the
human, was understood to be the
bodily seat of reason, the home of
the capacity that distinguished man
from dog. Such simple anatomical
differentiation had its foundation in
the classics - Aristotle, had proposed
man as the 'rational animal'. But in
The final phrase here
- 'how a Man differs
from a Dog'- seems to
be mere hyperbole: an
extreme rendition of a
casual human careless-
ness. But Burton's claim
is a familiar one. In the
early modern period
the description of many
vices - heavy drinking,
gluttony, lust and so on
- were represented as
having the power to
transform humans into
beasts. These represen-
tations would seem to
play into a theological
and moral conceptuali-
sation of the world, rather than a Robert Burton (1577-1640), author of the
'zoological' one. We might think that compendium The Anatomy of Melancholy.
'Atheistical dog', for example, a The first edition appeared in 1621, but he
recognisable insult in the period, is continued to revise the text until his death.
early modern discussions of percep-
tion and movement, an alternative
reality emerges in which the opposi-
tions human/animal and reason-
able/ unreasonable were never so
clearly polarised. Instead there was a
dangerous 'grey area' into which
many, too many, so-called humans
must be placed. In fact sometimes
the difference between a man and a
dog, as Burton said, is hard to find.
All animals, humans included, do
not exist in a vacuum; they exist in
the world, and have to make sense of
that world in order to act within it.
In early modern thought perception
was understood to be a very bodily
thing. The foundation of
the ideas about the rela-
tionship with, and experi-
ence of, the external
world was classical. Aristo-
tle's ideas came down to
thinkers like Burton via
medieval writers such as
Avicenna and Albert the
Great, who presented the
brain as a clearly struc-
tured object, and in The
Anatomy of Melancholy,
Burton proposed that the
brain, 'a soft, marrowish,
and white substance,' was
made up of 'two parts, the
fore and hinder part'. He
stated that the fore part of
the brain contained three
ventricles, and the hinder
part, one. The left and
right of the three ventri-
cles of the fore part were
home to the common
sense, while the middle,
... is a common concourse
and cavity of them both; and
bath two passages; the one
to receive Pituita [phlegm],
the other extends itself to the fourth
creek [ventricle, or the hinder part],
in this they place Imaginatdon.
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This 'fourth creek,' or 'Cere-
bell' is 'the place where they say
memory is seated'. The brain,
then, is structured to access,
translate, contemplate and
recall the material world. It
is the place where external
forms enter the interior
of the mind.
Burton and other
early modern writers
suggested that the
physical world
entered the brain
through the
mouth, the nose,
and touch, the
eyes and the
ears. These vari-
ous sensory forms
made an impact first on th
largest part of the brain's front ven-
tricle, the 'common sense'. For
Nicholas Coeffeteau, writing in 1620,
it was in the common sense that the
'forms wvhich are sent unto it from
other senses' 'flowv' into the brain. In
1631 Daniel Widdowes proposed
The History of Four-Footed Beasts (1607)
outlined the physical characteristics of
dogs, and compared their humours with
those of Man (describing those of dogs
as hotter and drier).
A man is what he eats?: Gluttony, from
'The Seven Deadly Sins' by Hieronyinus
Bosch.
that this faculty 'more fully distin-
guisheth sensible things'. To Wid-
dowes, the common sense first
brings outer forms into the mind,
but does so only when those forms
are present to the senses. It requires
an external form to engage with: it
needs the action of the senses to
make its common sense.
But the common sense was also
thought to have another function: it
was here actual forms are translat-
ed into ideal forms. Coeffeteau
noted that the common sense
..not only receives the forms
which the other senses send
unto it, but it also Compares
them, Discerns them, and
judgeth of them; the
which the particular
senses cannot do, for
that they are limited
and tied to their
particular objects,
and never exceed
the bounds thereof.
Tecommon sense, then,
was where shape, texture, smell and
*so on are brought together to reform
the representation of the whole
external object in the mind. The eye
on its own can only see, the nose,
only smell: the common sense was
*thought to put the messages of all
the individual senses together.
From the common sense, percep-
tion, in Burton's model, travelled
through to the middle ventricle of
the forepart of the brain - the imagi-
nation - where it became possible
for an object to be contemplated in
its absence (as in day-dreaming) and
for the creation of compound
images, things that have never been
seen (such as what a human-dog
crossbreed might look like). Finally,
the perceived object could enter into
the rear ventricle of the brain, the
memory. There it would be stored
for future reference.
So far, the capacities of the brain
outlined here were shared by
humans and animals. But, despite
the similarities of the structure of
humans' and animals' brains, a dis-
tinction was made based on the ani-
mal's relationship with time. Accord-
ing both to classical and early
modern arguments, animals live only
in the present. The sheep, sb this
argument goes, needs the wolf in
front of its eyes to know from memo-
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Dissection of the brain from Vesalius' De
Humani Corporis Fabrica (1543), showing
the corpus callosum that links the two
hemnispheres of the brain.
ry that the wolf is to be judged as
dangerous, whereas a human can
recollect the intention of a wolf in its
absence, and can feel fear on the
basis of an imagined animal. As
Gulielmus Gratarolus put it in 1562:
humans can remember 'w'out ye
presence of ye object', while 'with
the presence of the object [such
remembrance] is also found in brute
Beasts'. The source of this distinc-
tion is Aristotle's De memoria et remi-
niscentia. Aristotle here distinguished
between memory, as a form of per-
ception that animals share with
humans, and recollection, which is
only available to humans, as it is 'a
sort of reasoning'. This latter point is
crucial, as this form of memory was
not understood to be undertaken
with the brain - a bodily organ.
Rather, it was the property of the
inorganic soul.
As Katherine Park and Eckhardt
Kessler have shown (1988), there was
a crucial difference between the
'organic' and the 'inorganic' soul in
this period. Following ideas pro-
posed in Aristotle's De Anima, the
'organic' soul is understood to be
that bodily essence that allows, at a
basic level, for nutrition, reproduc-
tion and growth, and on a higher
level, perception and movement.
Such activities come from the body:
the liver was regarded as the centre
of the basic functions, and the heart
and the brain as homes to percep-
tion and movement. The organic
soul was shared by humans and ani-
mals (and even plants had some of
the basic aspects - nutrition, repro-
duction and growth). However,
humans had something more than
just the organic soul: they possessed
the inorganic soul, that immaterial
essence that gave a person access to
will, intellect and intellective memo-
ry. To say that a human being is a
rational animal is to say that a
human has an inorgan-
AA} ic soul. Animals cannot
reason, so this argu-
ment goes, not because
_ B they are stupid, but
. because they lack the
,' essential quality
required for the exer-
cise of reason. Animals
are stuck with the body,
the organic, while
humans can transcend
.. their bodily frame and
J-O` have access to the
immaterial, the spiritu-
al realm. By extension,
animals are stuck in the
present, whereas
humans have access to
the past and the future
Diagram of the inter-
action of eye, brain and
motor functions,
according to Rene
Descartes in 1644.
A diagram from G; Reisch Margarita
Mundi (1504), showing the ventricles of
the brain (the sites of fantasy, cogitation,
estimation and memory) and process of
dreams (the annotations A-E showing the
influences of cognition, dream, senses,
stars, and soul) within the first ventricle.
also.
This might appear to offer a clear
dividing line_between humans and
animals, between man and dog, but
further examination of the processes
of perception and movement reveal
a point at which the division breaks
down; where humans become beasts
in more than merely metaphorical
terms. This can be found when the
relationship between perception and
action, between brain and body, is
examined.
The 'Moving Faculty', for Burton,
as for other contemporary writers, is
housed in the heart and brain.
According to Burton the moving fac-
ulty had two functions: appetite and
motion. This appetite is housed with
the common sense, and just as the
common sense is situated in two ven-
tricles, so appetite is 'divided into
two powers, or inclinations, Concupis-
cible or Irascible'. The former 'covets
always pleasant and delightsome
things, and abhors that which is dis-
tasteful, harsh, or unpleasant', while
the latter avoids 'danger and indig-
nation'. Writing twenty years before
Burton, Thomas Wright had argued
that the two inclinations could be
termed more simply 'coveting and
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invading appetites.'
Passions, or affections that include
fear, hate, love, hope and so on, that
are grouped under the concupiscible
and irascible appetites, are not spiri-
tual but bodily. Burton makes this
clear: 'The good affections are
caused by some object of the same
nature'. That is, an external object
(or a memory, or imagined version
of it) must be in place in order for
passions to be aroused. Burton con-
tinues:
... and if present, [the objects]
procurejoy, which dilates the Heart,
and preserves the body: If absent,
they cause Hope, Love, Desire,
Concupiscence.
In these terms, sudden happiness
- an expansion of the heart - can
cause it to burst: one can truly die of
joy. The passion is inseparable from
its bodily source.
What follows from the arousal of
passion is motion, for, as Burton
notes:
... in vain were it otherwise to desire
and to abhor, if we had not likewise
power to prosecute or eschue, by
moving the Body from place to place.
The 'efficient cause' of movement
in man, he continues, is 'Reason, or
his subordinate Phantasie, which
apprehends this good or bad object.'
Thomas Wright presents this move-
ment in slightly different terms:
Passions and sense are determined to
one thing, and as soon as they
perceive their object, sense presently
receives it, and the passions love or
hate it: but reason, after she
perceiveth her object, she stands in
deliberation, whether it be
convenient she should accept it, or
refuse it.
Once again, a difference between
humans and animals appears here.
An animal follows its passions (it has
no choice as it has no reason) where-
as a human can deliberate and
decide whether to act or resist act-
ing. Yet this process of deliberation is
not as straightforward as Burton and
Wright would seem to suggest. There
was always a possibility that the pas-
sions could overwhelm reason; that,
like an animal, a human could
merely follow his or her desires.
A diagram of the layers of the head,
from Magnus Hundt's Antropologium
(1501), showing the three ventricles of
the brain, with intellect at the centre.
'See here how Nature's Book unclasped
lies/Whose pages Aesop reads with
pearcing eyes,/Who through wise
apologies from Beasts derived/Tells man
they for his conduct were contrived.' An
alternative view of the respective moral
sense of man and beast, from a 1666
edition of Aesop's Fables.
The classical model for represent-
ing this point came from Plato. In
Phaedrus he wrote of the soul as
being like 'the natural union of a
team of winged horses and their
charioteer'. One of the horses is
beautiful and obedient, while the
other ugly and disobedient. The
charioteer has to steer both along his
chosen path, and this is not an easy
task. For early modern writers this
image of equine management
remained the conventional way of
describing control of the bodily
urges - the passions. For Laurent
Joubert in his 1579 Traite du Ris
(Treatise on Laughter), the relation-
ship of the will (inorganic) and the
heart - the seat of the passions is
likened to 'a child on the back of a
fierce horse that carries it impetu-
ously about'. There is, Joubert
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argues, some reining in of the pas-
sions by the will but ultimately the
will needs the passions ('it is unable
to perform its functions without
their aid') and can be overwhelmed
by them: appetite, Joubert writes,
'often contradicts the will'. A reason-
able human may work to control, to
bridle desires; and such bridling is
itself evidence of humans' reason-
able nature.
Robert Burton was a Protestant
thinker, and the denigration of
humans in Protestant theology
(Calvin regularly termed the human
being a 'worm') fitted with the psy-
chology he described:
Our concupiscence is originally bad,
our Heart evil, the seat of our
Affections captivates and enforceth
our Will: So that in voluntary things
we are averse from God and
goodness, bad by Nature, by
ignorance worse, by Art,
Discipline, Custom, we get many
bad Habits, suffering them to 4
domineer and tyrannise over us,
and the Devil is still ready at
hand, with his evil suggestions, to
tempt our depraved will to some
ill-disposed action, to precipitate
us to destruction.
One limit upon our innate evil
is the word of God, the other is
our reason, or whatJohn Donne
called God's 'viceroy in me'. But
reason is often for Donne 'weak
or untrue', and likewise Burton
People in the 16th century believed a
man could voluntarily transform into
a werewolf by putting on a wolfskin
or through the application of magic
salves or ointments. Illustration by
Lucas Cranach (1510-15).
argues that it is, 'over born by Pas-
sion'. The image Burton uses is truly
conventional: 'as so many wild horses
run away with a chariot, and will not
be curbed', so the will might be over-
whelmed by the passions but must
learn to restrain them.
But if restraint fails, or if restraint
is not sought after at all, the effects
are clear. Joubert terms a laugh that
is purely bodily - that involves no
moral or intellectual understanding
- 'dog laughter'. Likewise, greed, a
giving in to fleshly temptation, is a
descent from human to animal. As
Thomas Cogan wrote in The Haven of
Health (1584):
Now, what a reproach is it, for man
whom God hath created after his own
likeness, and endued with reason,
whereby he differeth from beasts, to
Man's best friends: caring for hunting
dogs from a 14th-century book of
hunting.
be yet beastlike, to be moved by sense
and serve his belly, to follow his
appetite contrary to reason? for as
much as by the very order of nature,
reason ought to rule, & all appetites
are to be bridled and subdued.
Eight years earlier, Thomas New-
ton had asked,
Who is he, that being thoroughly
whittled in drink, doth not beastly
rush into venerous lust, and filthy
desires? For when the body is
bumbasted with drink, and
bellycheer, the privities and secret
parts do swell, and have a marvellous
desire to carmal coiture.
The word 'beastly' here appears
a commonplace adjective, a
description with some moral
overtones, but there is a logic
that makes beastliness not only
the antithesis of godliness, but
e also a real possibility. Giving in
to the desires of the body - to
over-indulgence in food, alco-
hol, sex and so on - means that
reason is being overwhelmed by
passion, and if reason is over-
whelmed and not used then
that which separates human
i from animal is gone. Following
this logic, as Burton was, it is in
fact frequently hard to tell the
f difference between a man and
a dog.
t This failure to achieve human
f status, or the failure to main-
tain it once it had been
achieved, was not only Burton's
F preoccupation, then. ForJohn
i Baptista Nenna the destruction
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Riding high: the equestrian portrait
provided the ultimate image of human
nobility. Francis I of France, painted in
c.1540 by FranVois Clouet.
of the difference between humans
and animals was a type of destruc-
tion of a bloodline; the end of a
noble house. In his Treatise of Nobility
he states:
True and perfect nobility of man,
consisteth only in that part, which
maketh man different from beasts;
and that is reason, by the which he is
called a reasonable creature, and the
other [i.e. animal] unreasonable ...
He then who leadeth this mortal life
swerving from reason, is not to be
accounted or called Noble, albeit that
he descend of noble blood: For albeit
he hath the outward shape of a man,
being deprived of the most Noble
part, which God hath given unto man
(I mean reason) he remaineth
without doubt to be reckoned
amongst unreasonable creatures, and
to be compared unto beasts: which
being not partakers of reason, do lead
their life according as their sense
teacheth them.
Self-knowledge, what Burton felt
was lacking in many men, required
judgement, discernment, qualities
housed in the inorganic soul. A lack
of self-knowledge, in these terms,
revealed an absence of the inorgan-
ic, and showed the human to be all
body, like a beast. Even, for Nenna,
nobility of blood could not counter
this. Beastly status, it would seem,
was equally available to all.
But it is not only in following the
desires of the body rather than the
deliberation of the mind that early
modern humans found their status
compromised. Ill health was regard-
ed as evidence of a moral failing on
the part of the individual. As the cul-
tural historian Michael Schoenfeldt
has noted, 'health assumed the role
of a moral imperative'. The individu-
al is 'the agent rather than the victim
of his or her health,' and can be
blamed 'for the illness that arbitrari-
ly afflicts him or her'. That is, illness
is a marker of immorality; individuals
are not helpless in the face of dis-
ease, rather they are perceived to
Horse training: woodcuts byjost Amman,
1599.
create the situation in which those
diseases appear. According to
Thomas Cogan,
..mean and temperate diet ... is
more commendable than all the
delicate fare in the world, and ought
of the godly to be esteemed as a thing
that best contenteth nature, and
preserveth health.
By implication, intemperance (giv-
ing in to one's passions) not only
endangers health, but ill health also
reveals one's intemperance: it is a
vicious circle.
Illness in this interpretation
exhibits the individual's failing as a
human being. If excessive indul-
gence in fleshly pleasure is evidence
of the overwhelming of reason by
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the passions, and the passions are
the product of the body's (as
opposed to the mind's) relationship
with the external world, then giving
in to the passions reveals a human
who lacks that which makes him
human in the first place. Greed, in
this reading, is immoral, and it dehu-
manises: and that last term is to be
taken literally. When Robert Burton
writes that he wants to enable his
(not so) human readers to be able to
tell the difference between a man
and a dog, we should take him liter-
ally.
The logic works in the other direc-
tion, however. There is one place
where we can see the creation of a
human who is truly distinct from an
animal. We look neither to theology,
nor to psychology to find this, rather
we look at horse-training manuals.
Where the image of the rampant pas-
sions overwhelming reason had
been, since Plato, that of the uncon-
trollable chariot, so rule over horses
in a very different discourse also
speaks of the establishment of the
status of humanity.
The Fall was understood to be the
moment when human status was
originally compromised. It was when,
as William Perkins put it in his Expo-
sition of the Symbole (1595), humans
became 'deformed children of
wrath'. The Fall simultaneously
caused the animals who had, in Par-
adise, been tame, to become wild.
John Moore wrote that with the Fall
humans 'procured ... the disobedi-
ence of all the creatures towards
himself. Hereof comes the fierceness
of lions, bears, tigers, wolves and all
the wild beasts.' Just as Adam was
afflicted with the sweat of labour,
and Eve with the pain of childbirth,
so all humans were blighted with the
enmity of animals.
This theological discussion finds
its way into texts that seem to us far
from religious in their interest. In
The Perfection of Horsemanship (1609),
for example, Nicholas Morgan noted
that after the Fall man 'lost all obedi-
ence, which by original creation was
subject unto him, & ... now the obe-
dience of all creatures must be
attained by Art, and this same pre-
served in vigour by use and practice'.
Horseriding, for Morgan, is an
emblem of successful human domin-
ion, and it replicates the relationship
with animals that was held by Adam
before the exit from Eden. To ride a
horse, in these terms, is to return to
a perfect natural order. In fact, train-
ing - making an unreasonable crea-
ture act as if reasonable (no more
than this as jf could be expected) -
was by logical extension a display of
the humanity of the rider. Exercising
control over a 'lower animal' really
did give evidence of control over the
self.
Such a construction of the train-
ing and riding of horses allows for,
almost calls upon, some of the terrifi-
The 'Getulian' or 'Mimic' dog
(possibly a poodle) was thought to
resemble an ape and to have been
popular in ancient Egypt and Rome
for the tricks it could be taught to
perform. From Edward Topsell's
History of Four-Footed Beasts (1607).
Taming of the shrew? A human couple
and a canine one both get to know one
another better in Matthias Scheits's
genre painting of the later 17th century.
cally cruel training methods used in
the period. The training manuals
reveal not only early modern human-
ity's sense of animals' lack of moral
value (inflicting pain upon them is
pedagogically useful, and not some-
thing to worry about), but also, in
the image of the use of whip and
chain, a vicious human desire to
regain the stability of self-knowledge.
Nowadays cruelty to animals is often
perceived as a failing in the human
protagonist. In the early modern
period such cruelty had another
meaning: ironically, a well-trained
horse could speak volumes about the
truly human nature of its owner.
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